Against Gettier

In “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” Edmund Gettier (1963) attacked the thesis ‘S knows that P iff P is true, S believes that P, and S is justified in believing that P’. His intention was to sustain that someone can have a justified true belief without knowing that belief. He made that by creating two counter-examples to that thesis. In this article, I try to show that Gettier’s arguments are based in a weak account of justification, and that such a weak view cannot talk about someone knowing something. I begin by presenting his counter-examples, and then I show they do not work.

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Citação: Cid, Rodrigo (2011). "Against Gettier". Philpapers. Acessado em  /  /  , e encontrado em http://philpapers.org/archive/CIDAG.1.pdf.