July 2-4, 2012
A long-standing assumption in meta-ethics is that moral thought and language is either purely cognitive or purely non-cognitive. But this has recently been called into question.For whilst such pure theories seem to easily explain some elements of moral thought and language they seem to have a hard time explaining or accommodating others. This has led to the development of so-called hybrid theories, which take moral thought and language to combine cognitive and non-cognitive elements in some way. This conference brings together a large number of those presently working on hybrid theories to examine the prospects of these theories in meta-ethics, and the meta-normative more generally, and in other areas where similar theories have been proposed, such as how pejorative terms work.
http://bit.ly/q6sZUO
Where: University of Edinburgh (precise venue TBA)
Speakers:
Dorit Bar-On, University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill)
Stephen Barker, University of Nottingham
Dan Boisvert, University of North Carolina (Charlotte)
Matthew Chrisman, University of Edinburgh
David Copp, University of California (Davis)
John Erikkson, University of Gothenberg
Steve Finlay, University of Southern California
Guy Fletcher, University of Edinburgh
Ryan Hay, Occidential College
Jennifer Hornsby, University of London (Birkbeck)
Mike Ridge, University of Edinburgh
Mark Schroeder, University of Southern California
Laura Schroeter, University of Melbourne
Francois Schroeter, University of Melbourne
Jon Tresan, University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill)
Organisers:
Guy Fletcher - Guy.fletcher@ed.ac.uk
Mike Ridge - Mike.Ridge@ed.ac.uk
We are grateful to the Mind Association for financial support for this conference.
