Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa
LanCog Group (Language, Mind and Cognition Research Group)
Instituto Filosófico de Pedro Hispano, Departamento de Filosofia da UL
http://lancog.com/
2011-12: Session 4
Frege on Singular Thoughts
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Marco Ruffino (Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro)
19 de Dezembro de 2011, 16:00
Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa
Sala Mattos Romão (departamento de Filosofia)
Abstract: In thispaper I investigate how, according to Frege, a thought can be singular (in the sense of being about a particular object, not in the sense of being something like a Russellian proposition, which Frege famously rejects). This is closely related to the question of the nature of singular senses, i.e., senses of what we might call Fregean proper names (which include not only ordinary proper names, but also definite descriptions and indexicals). I shall try to show that Frege does not have a unique explanation of singular senses. On the contrary, we can find elements of two conflicting views in his writings: the first considers singular senses as resulting from a peculiar kind of speech act. The second sees singular senses as resulting from the combination of the sense of quantifiers with conceptual senses. None of these views is entirely compatible with the rest of Frege’s semantics. I conclude that Frege has no coherent alternative to Russellian singular thoughts.
Sponsored by: Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa
For further information, please contact
Professor João Branquinho
Department of Philosophy
Faculdade de Letras
Universidade de Lisboa
Alameda da Universidade
1600-214 Lisboa
Portugal
Telephone +(351)217920000
