January 10-11, 2014, University of Leeds
Confirmed Speakers: John Campbell, Kathrin Gluer-Pagin, Jason Leddington, M.G.F Martin.
In defending some particular view about the nature of perceptual states
(most often naive realism) it is sometimes claimed that perceptual states
have a special role to play in the theory of mind: that of making contentful
thought possible. There is a related suggestion sometimes made about
singular thought: there must be singular thoughts because, without singular
thoughts, contentful thought in general would not be possible. Given that a
similar grounding role is assigned by some philosophers to perceptual
states, and by others to a singular thoughts, we might ask: why are
perceptual states rather than singular thoughts, or singular thoughts rather
than perceptual states, distinctively fit to play the role of making
contentful thought possible? The role of this workshop is to address this
and closely related questions about the role of, and relationship between,
singular thought and perception.
There is no cost to attend the workshop, but registration is required.
Please email firstname.lastname@example.org to register.
Registration Deadline: January 1, 2014
This workshop is sponsored by the Nature of Representation project, a five
year research project on the metaphysics and epistemology of mental and
linguistic representaion, funded by the European Research Council and headed
by Professor Robbie Williams.
Immediately preceding this workshop (on January 9-10), there will be a
workshop on the Motivations for Naive Realism, also at the University of
Leeds (confirmed speakers: Alex Byrne, M.G.F. Martin, Thomas Raleigh,
Susanna Schellenberg, Charles Travis). Please contact Heather Logue
(email@example.com) for details.