In his Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, Kant ascribes universal importance to the virtuous practices of truth-telling and promise-keeping. One task of this lecture series will be to investigate the extent to which this emphasis is justified. But if it were, what would truth-telling and promise-keeping require, according to Kant’s own analysis of truth in the Critique of Pure Reason? Given the ways in which Kant there complicates the naïve realist understanding of in what truth consists, is it even possible for us to tell the truth or keep our promises with anything close to the stringency on which Kant insists in the Groundwork? And if it is not possible, what are the implications for our social and political relationships? All three lectures presuppose prior familiarity with Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Please bring both texts with you to each lecture.
