quarta-feira, 14 de dezembro de 2011

Hybrid Theories in Meta-Ethics

July 2-4, 2012

A long-standing assumption in meta-ethics is that moral thought and language is either purely cognitive or purely non-cognitive. But this has recently been called into question.For whilst such pure theories seem to easily explain some elements of moral thought and language they seem to have a hard time explaining or accommodating others. This has led to the development of so-called hybrid theories, which take moral thought and language to combine cognitive and non-cognitive elements in some way. This conference brings together a large number of those presently working on hybrid theories to examine the prospects of these theories in meta-ethics, and the meta-normative more generally, and in other areas where similar theories have been proposed, such as how pejorative terms work.


Where: University of Edinburgh (precise venue TBA)


Dorit Bar-On, University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill)

Stephen Barker, University of Nottingham

Dan Boisvert, University of North Carolina (Charlotte)

Matthew Chrisman, University of Edinburgh

David Copp, University of California (Davis)

John Erikkson, University of Gothenberg

Steve Finlay, University of Southern California

Guy Fletcher, University of Edinburgh

Ryan Hay, Occidential College

Jennifer Hornsby, University of London (Birkbeck)

Mike Ridge, University of Edinburgh

Mark Schroeder, University of Southern California

Laura Schroeter, University of Melbourne

Francois Schroeter, University of Melbourne

Jon Tresan, University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill)


Guy Fletcher - Guy.fletcher@ed.ac.uk

Mike Ridge - Mike.Ridge@ed.ac.uk

We are grateful to the Mind Association for financial support for this conference.

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