quarta-feira, 16 de novembro de 2011

International Conference: Truth-Makers and Proof-Objects

23-25 November 2011
Ecole normale supérieure, 45 rue d'Ulm 75005
Salle des Actes

Website : http://tmpo.sciencesconf.org/

Followed by the Workshop
Acts and Propositional Content
26 November 2011
IHPST, 13 rue du Four 75006
Grande Salle

See the respective programmes below

Conference Programme

Wednesday 23 November:

Chair : Per Martin-Löf
09:00-09:15 Welcome
09:15-10:30 Kit Fine "Truthmaker semantics for intuitionistic logic"
10:30-11:00 Coffee break
11:00-12:15 Göran Sundholm "Meaning and truth-making in constructive
mathematics: Heyting's proof-explanations vs. Kleene's realizability

12:15-14:00 Lunch

Chair : Aarne Ranta
14:00-15:15 Kevin Mulligan "Making true vs. making known"
15:15-15:30 Break
15:30-16:45 Guido Lörher "Truth-making and knowing"
16:45-17:00 Break
17:00-18:15 Giuseppe Primiero "Modes of truth, ways of knowing"

Thursday 24 November:

Chair : Göran Sundholm
09:00-10:15 Stephen Read "Truthmakers in John Buridan's logic"
10:15-10:45 Coffee break
10:45-12:00 Jacob Schmutz "Who invented truth-makers? The late-scholastic debate
on "verificativa""

12:00-14:00 Lunch

Chair : Peter Simons
14:00-15:15 Maria van der Schaar "G.F. Stout: tropes and truth-makers"
15:15-15:30 Break
15:30-16:45 Frédéric Nef "Why there are truth-makers and what they have to do
with proof"
16:45-17:00 Break
17:00-18:15 Luc Schneider "Two senses of making true"

Friday 25 November:

Chair : Maria van der Schaar
09:00-10:15 Peter Simons "Makers for vague propositions"
10:15-10:45 Coffee break
10:45-12:00 Mark Textor "Bolzano on grounding and a priori truth"

12:00-14:00 Lunch

Chair : Kit Fine
14:00-15:15 Friederike Moltmann "Explicit expressions of truth-making in natural
15:15-15:30 Break
15:30-16:45 Pascal Boldini "Reasons, proof-objects, and anaphora"
16:45-17:00 Break
17:00-18:15 Aarne Ranta "Proof objects for the languages of the world"

19:30 : Conference dinner

Organisers :
Per Martin-Löf
Henri Galinon

Institutions :
IHPST (CNRS, Université Paris-1)
Département d'informatique de l'Ecole normale supérieure
Dans le cadre de la Chaire Internationale de Recherche Blaise Pascal financée
par l'Etat et la Région d’Ile-de-France, gérée par la Fondation de l'Ecole
Normale Supérieure.


Workshop Programme

09.15-10.30 Kevin Mulligan (Université de Genève)
"Acceptance, Affirmation, Agreement, Acknowledgment, Assertion, Belief,
Certainty, Conviction, Denial, Judgment, Refusal, and Rejection"

Coffee break

10.45-12.00 Mark Textor (King's College London)
"Reinach on Rejection and Negation"

Lunch break

14.30-15.45 Friederike Moltmann (IHPST - CNRS/Paris 1/ENS)
"The Action-Product Distinction for Transitive Intensional Verbs"

Coffee break

16.00-17.15 Maria van der Schaar (Leiden University)
"Wooden Horses and False Friends; a Classification for Non-Attributive Terms"


Friederike Moltmann
"The Action-Product Distinction for Transitive Intensional Verbs"
In 1912, Twardowksi introduced a distinction between 'actions' and 'products':
actions (and states) are for example a 'thinking', a 'requesting', and a 'state
of believing', whereas products include a 'thought', a 'request' and a 'belief'.
The two sorts of entities are distinguished in a number of ways: most
importantly only products have truth or more generally satisfaction conditions
and enter similarity relations according to a shared content. In this talk I
explore the way the distinction between actions and products manifests itself
with transitive intensional verbs, such as 'need', 'desire', 'see', and 'buy'.
I argue that the complement of transitive intensional verbs serves not to
characterize a constituent of a cognitive content, but rather the satisfier
(truthmaker) of the product of the action or state the verb describes. Moreover
in general it is possible satisfiers that constitute shared contents of
transitive intensional verbs.

Kevin Mulligan
"Acceptance, Affirmation, Agreement, Acknowledgment, Assertion, Belief,
Certainty, Conviction, Denial, Judgment, Refusal, and Rejection"
Do our doxastic and intellectual states, activities and acts come in polarly
opposed kinds, positive and negative ? I argue that this is, with one
exception, the case. I rely on an account of the category of attitudes put
forward by the earliest phenomenologists rather than the promiscuous and sloppy
category of attitudes popular within analytic philosophy.

Maria van der Schaar
"Wooden Horses and False Friends; a Classification for Non-Attributive Terms"
The paper uses the method of linguistic phenomenology to explain how mere belief
can be elucidated as botched knowing. First, three kinds of non-attributive
terms are distinguished, modifying, privative and restorative terms. It is
shown what the logical properties are of terms like 'fake', 'mere' and 'real',
words that etiolate the meaning of the terms to which they belong, and in what
way Partee (2010), in which it is asserted that these terms behave like
ordinary terms, can be rebutted.

Mark Textor
"Reinach on Rejection and Negation"
The Rejective View of Negation holds that sentential negation is to be explained
on the basis of a prior understanding of the linguistic act or mental act of
rejecting (denying). This act is supposed to be 'on all fours' with assertion
(judgement). In this talk I will develop and defend Reinach's objections
against the assumption of an act of rejection.

Oranised by Friederike Moltmann

Sponsored by:
The Chair d'Excellence Ontological Structure and Semantic Structure

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