Ghent University (Belgium), Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science
Friday, 23 September
*** Note that this workshop is held only 2 days after the CaEitS 2011 conference at the same location ***
Kuhn's description of the aggregate dynamics of scientific change rests on a vague and fragmented account of how scientists choose between theories. Criteria of theory choice are not an algorithmic set of rules waiting to be discovered but rather "rules of thumb": vague and conflicting. Theory choice can therefore never be settled by logic and experiment alone, but relies on "persuasion" and "conversion". And once converted, scientists "dogmatically" stick to their paradigm even when good reasons arise for its rejection. The lack (impossibility?) of rationality on Kuhn's approach is one of the main reasons why Kuhn's philosophy of science failed to gain widespread acceptance despite its intuitive appeal and popularity among practicing scientists. 50 years after the publication of the "Structure of Scientific Revolutions" the following questions still arise:
- Is an account of Kuhnian rationality impossible or did Kuhn just fail to articulate one?
- In what sense can Kuhnian scientists be said to be rational?
- Can new perspectives (network theory, bounded confidence,...) on rationality clarify Kuhn's claims to rationality?
PROGRAMME:
9:30 - 10:15 - Thomas Nickles (University of Nevada)
10:15 - 11:00 - Dunja Seselja (Ghent University)
11:00 - 11:30 - Coffee break
11:30 - 12:15 - Rogier De Langhe (Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies)
12:15 - 13:00 - Tim De Mey (Erasmus University Rotterdam)
13:00 - 14:30 - Workshop lunch
14:30 - 15:15 - Maarten Van Dyck (Ghent University)
15:15 - 16:00 - General discussion
VENUE:
Blandijnberg 2, room 2.16
Faculty of Arts and Letters
Ghent University, Belgium
REGISTRATION is not required and attendance is free.
